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Abstract: While the redevelopment of urban brownfield sites in China has received much attention,
the role of political ideology in this process is usually downplayed or sidelined to a set of stylized
assumptions. This paper invites giving a greater analytical focus to the evolving and nonorthodox
nature of China’s politico-ideological model as a factor shaping urban change and redevelopment.
The paper provides an analytical framework integrating multi-level and evolutionary perspectives
while exploring the experiences of the formation and post-industrial redevelopment of brownfield
sites in Beijing. The analysis demonstrates that neoliberal economic policies and the communist
political doctrine are co-constitutive in the production of China’s post-industrial urban space. This
produces a sense of spatial hybridity that combines and co-embeds what may be assumed to be
mutually exclusive.
Keywords: urban brownfield; post-industrial; hybrid spatiality; Beijing; Fatou
1. Introduction
Issues pertaining to brownfield redevelopment in post-industrial urban contexts have recently
gained broad attention across the world [1–4]. China has not stayed outside these processes. Despite its
overall trajectories of rapid industrialization (rather than deindustrialization), the industrial structure
does change in China—and rather rapidly so—with the consequence being that many industrial assets
experience quick depreciation. In addition, the sheer size of the non-manufacturing economy is also
radically expanding in China. All this has spatial consequences. For example, while inner cities
experience commercialization and increases in land rents, industries are forced to move from central to
more peripheral locations. What these industries leave behind are often abandoned, and contaminated
sites, or “brownfields”. Consequently, brownfield redevelopment and land reuse have become political
priorities in China’s cities.
Literature on urban brownfield has ranged in its concerns broadly to encompass, for example,
debates about drivers and barriers of brownfield redevelopment [2,3,5–7], mechanisms and stakeholders
involved in different phases of redevelopment process [1,8,9], potential reuses [10,11], and evaluations
of impacts and benefits of redevelopment [12–15]. Furthermore, brownfield regeneration is often seen
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from the perspective of the economic logic of neoliberalism underpinning contemporary urban change.
Existing inquiries into China’s transformation and urban restructuring also emphasize neoliberalism
and market mechanisms, while considering the still-prominent communist ideology as mostly an
ideological ‘noise’, which is somehow external to urban restructuring per se [16].
In this paper, we want to revisit the interplay between political and economic factors in urban
change and redevelopment in Beijing. Using brownfields as an insightful lens, we want to demonstrate
that, in the case of China, neoliberal strategies and communist ideologies are both actively combined
in the production of urban space. While it is the neoliberal logic that drives today’s pro-growth
and pro-globalization “extraverted” urban agendas [17], the influences of the communist ideology
on urban space are still strong and appear both as historical/legacy spaces and as ongoing/active
spaces. Here, legacy spaces are being subsumed and maneuvered into today’s requirements, but these
requirements are being shaped not only by the logics of neoliberalism, but also (and quite actively so)
by the communist doctrine. This produces a sense of spatial hybridity that combines and co-embeds
ideological elements that may be assumed to be mutually contradictory.
The empirical foundation of the paper is based on field studies carried out in 2018–2019 in Fatou,
an area in Beijing that used to be a chemical manufacturing complex under state industrialism, but
which has more recently been converted into a residential area. It is an emblematic case for the rise
and fall of industrial areas in Beijing, and can illustrate the drivers of urban change. The story of
Fatou involves the construction of a socialist manufacturing enterprise under state-led industrialism
in the 1950s–1960s, the expansion of the industrial zone in the 1970s–1990s, and its subsequent fall
under emerging neoliberalism. We review the evolution of Fatou in these three distinctive periods
as a multi-level “momentum”—involving the projection and interplay of the national-, city-, and
district-level processes (Table 1). A number of local policy documents, government publications, and
media reports have supported our analysis.
Table 1. Urban development in Beijing.
City Development
Stage
1950s–1960s
Urbanization Through
Industrialization
Late 1970s–1990s
Accelerated Urbanization and
Decentralization
2000s–2010s
Restructuring in Post-Reform Period
International
context
-Modeling development after the
Soviet Union;
-Industrial geography.
-Neoliberalism and globalism;
-Borrowing planning ideas and
experience from market economies.
-Global city system;
-Global city-regionism.
State-level context
-State industrialization puts
priority on heavy industry;
-Administrative allocation of land
and danwei system providing
housing and social services.
-Domestic reforms from a centrally
planned to a market-oriented system;
-Fiscal and administrative
decentralization;
-Urban land system reform and land
leasehold market
established;-Housing reform.
-Coordinated development of the
Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei;
-Promises under the world
heritage conservation.
City-level context
(Beijing)
-Socialist productive cities;
-Heavy industry-led policies;
-Planning and construction of
industrial areas.
-Policies for “national political and
cultural center” in 1983 and “modern
international city” in 1992;
-‘Decentralized conglomerates’ spatial
pattern for industries;
-Industrial park and economic and
technological development zone as a
key spatial strategy for industries;
-Industrial relocation policies.
- ‘World city’ planning proposal
in 2000s;
-2008 Beijing Olympic Games;
-Industrial upgrading and
intra-regional relocation;
-Renovation Program and Public
Housing Program.
District-level
context (Fatou)
-Rural landscape before 1950s;
-Chemical Industrial Area
construction in 1950s;
-Residential community built up;
-Incorporated into city
management in 1960s.
-Forms an area surrounding a
Z-shaped main road in 1970s;
-Destination of industrial in-migration
from the central city in 1980s;
-Incorporated into central urban area,
became an industry out-migration
place in 1990s.
-The removal of chemical industrial
enterprises;
-Brownfield assessment and
remediation;
-Planning and redevelopment through
property development and heritage
protection mechanisms.
Source: Authors.
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In what follows, we start with developing our conceptual approach by reviewing literature on
brownfield redevelopment, neoliberalization, and continuity and change in urban spatial structures. We
then provide an introduction to Beijing’s transition from a socialist productive city into a post-industrial
metropolis. By establishing an analysis framework that combines multi-level and evolutionary
perspectives, further inquiries about the hybridity of active communist political ideology and
operational neoliberal economic policies are conducted with the empirical case of Fatou and its
formation as, first, an industrial and, then, post-industrial area.
2. Exploring Brownfield Redevelopment
The recycling of formerly industrial land, especially currently unused or underused land, has
been long at the center of policy and academic literature. This has been an important issue in regions
with a history of deindustrialization, like in Europe and North America. Both site-specific attributes
and structural factors determine the emergence and character of brownfields and their destinies. As
for the contextual factors, extant studies suggest that property relationships, geographical location,
type of industrial activity, and levels of contamination are among attributes influencing the trajectories
of brownfield development and redevelopment [18–20]. However, brownfields are certainly a product
of broader processes and shifts. These multi-level factors include deindustrialization and economic
transition (beginning as early as the 1970s in Western Europe and in the 1990s in post-socialist
Eastern and Central Europe), international/interregional industrial migration, investment deficit in old
industrial places [4,21,22], innovation and organizational shifts in industrial processes, environmental
policies, commercialization, and increases in land rents in inner cities (as in the 2000s in China) [23].
Moreover, negative impacts imposed by manufacturing on the environment and health conditions as
well as extensive land-use footprints are among factors that put further pressures on traditional urban
industrial areas [16,24,25].
There is a broad consensus that brownfield redevelopment can be part of the larger efforts to
address land use problems, improve social cohesion, and create favorable economic conditions [26,27].
There are yet variations in motivations, concerns, and priorities among different regions, as can be
seen across Europe. For example, making land available for urban development is often prioritized in
densely populated and economically advanced countries (e.g., the UK, Germany, Belgium) [28–30]. For
regions with relatively low population density (Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Norway), the focus is
often placed on dealing with pollution and contamination [31–33]. Countries in Southern and Central
Europe have considered brownfield redevelopment as a driver of economic regeneration [34–36].
Brownfield redevelopment constitutes different phases, requiring enormous endeavors from
multiple stakeholders with potentially divergent interests. However, almost everywhere, the increasing
attention to the nexus between brownfield redevelopment, environmental and health safety, and broader
sustainability makes brownfields subject to extensive public interventions. Though circumstances
vary among countries, incentives and steer given by governments play an essential role, no matter
whether strategies are market-based or state-led [6,37]. Public initiatives may involve regulation,
technical standards, funding supports, and planning policies, among other forms [3,38]. Taking the
US as an example, as early as in the 1980s, brownfield liabilities fell under the federal and state
legislative framework (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act—CERCLA)—although such a heavy-handed regulatory approach was criticized for discouraging
private parties’ involvement. The Environmental Protection Agency’s Brownfield Program in the
1990s and the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 were further
important vehicles promoting brownfield redevelopment in the US [3,6,39]. In urban China, the
state has quite a direct leverage, as brownfields generally emerge from the outmigration of formerly
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), so that key stakeholders involved in their redevelopment are SOEs
themselves as well as local governments and developers [5,40].
Brownfields may be converted into a range of land uses, including residential buildings, creative
industrial zones, pocket parks, museums, leisure places, and others [41–43]. In the US, the most
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commonly reported reuses include commercial uses, green space, mixed use, residential use, and
industrial use [44]. As another example, according to Osman et al. [4], new functions of brownfields
in Czechia are predominantly civic amenities, mixed use, and industry. In the UK, the reuse of
brownfield land for housing has been a strategic land-use policy instrument since the 1990s [45].
Brownfield redevelopment is widely acclaimed for bringing a broad range of benefits to society, for
instance, providing land for new housing, public spaces, and facilities, as well as new and alternative
economic and employment opportunities, with the consequent expansion of tax bases and elimination
of environmental and health threats [11,45–49].
In China’s major cities, residential use, creative industrial zone uses, and heritage preservation are
popular functions for converted brownfields. Real estate development and the promise of quick profit
realization have certainly driven many landmark redevelopment projects, like the redevelopment of
Yangpu industrial area in Shanghai [50]. While many such projects involve a complete removal of all of
the industrial uses, with the rise of the middle class and a cultural shift towards a post-modern society,
the industrial aesthetics are now also increasingly monetized in urban China. Thus, industrial heritage
and creative industrial parks, such as Factory 798 in Beijing or Red Town Creative Park in Shanghai,
have gained popularity [41,51]. Policy discourse of the heritagization of brownfields particularly
accelerated after the 2006 Wuxi Forum on the conservation of cultural heritage and the release of China
Industrial Heritage Protection List [52].
Generally, studies converge on that brownfield redevelopment is a highly contextualized issue,
whose complexity relies in the interactions among many sets of factors. However, the role of government
ideology as one of major underlying factors steering brownfield formation and redevelopment has
so far attracted little direct attention. Since the emergence of the brownfield redevelopment agenda
in China coincided with neoliberalization, it is generally assumed that it is the logic of the latter that
shapes the institutional conditions, processes, and outcomes of brownfield redevelopment. This is,
however, not only to overlook the historicity of brownfield space (that is, the ideological conditions
under which the brownfields were produced in the first place and the interplay of these conditions with
today’s modalities), but also to overlook the enduring influence of the Chinese communist doctrine on
the production of urban space. In other words, we need to start unpacking the hybrid spatialities of
the Chinese post-industrial urban landscape.
3. Neoliberalization and Hybridity
Hybridity is a concept that has been actively debated in fields such as cultural studies
and post-colonialism, but it has also found its way into urban and geographical studies.
Golubchikov et al. [53] use hybridity for critiquing the spatiality of post-socialist transition. Their
research understands post-socialism as a process of the subsumption of inherited spatial systems
into the logic of capital, so that pre-existing urban space is transformed into the new relationships
of capitalist production despite its continuing material legacies. What was originally produced to
serve a socialist political economy and the ideology of egalitarian redistribution is now institutionally
transformed—often with no change in its material appearance—to serve the now very different logic
of capital accumulation. The very same urban system that previously served as the infrastructure of
spatial and social justice, under the new politico-economic system, even where remaining the same
in its appearance and function, turns into the infrastructure of (uneven) capital accumulation and its
socially differentiating consequences [53,54]. This re-institutionalizing of space also provides a sense
of spatial hybridity, where different ideological origins of space are blended together to make a union
that functions according to the new requirements of the political economy of the day (see also [55]).
In China, beyond the spatial legacy of the “pure” socialist decades, urban space continues to
be under the influences of a “mixed” model of today, in which communism is still decisively an
integral ideological part. According to Wu [56], the Chinese model of neoliberalization consists of
two seemingly contradictory yet, in reality, complementary elements: A market mechanism and
strong state control. However, the theoretical perspective of neoliberal urbanism often tends to
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over-simplify issues in the state–market relationship as “diametrically opposed principles of social
organization” [57]. Following Golubchikov et al. [53], we rather suggest that “hybrid spatiality” is
a perspective to overcome this binary of “pure” models and understand the mutual embeddedness
of the political ideology of communism and the economic ideology of neoliberalism in producing
China’s post-industrial urban space. Contrary to the other ex-socialist spaces in Eastern Europe, it is
not only that socialist legacies are remolded as infrastructure of capital accumulation, but the market
mechanism is also “filtered through” the active but evolving ideology of communism. This adds a
degree of complexity to the sense of hybridity in the production of new urban space in China.
This filtrating of market forces is the domestication of global neoliberalism in China, achieved
through large-scale but gradual transformations. While the market pricing mechanism was introduced
and political–economic power was given to the localities, essential ideological elements (such as
state-owned land tenure, powerful state intervention, the binary structure of urban and rural areas)
have not been overturned [23,58]. Such institutional arrangements have direct reflections on the
practice of urban development. Importantly, urban planning, especially master plan at the municipal
level, remains a powerful order of direct guidance to urban development activities [59].
After the establishment of the socialist China in 1949, following the model of the Soviet Union,
the system included public land ownership and a single administrative system of urban land-use
allocation. Urban planning acted as an extension tool for the five-year national economic development
plans and served mainly to territorialize national industrial programs. A model of socialist urbanism
was established, which contained, for example, the emblematic danwei system—a form of the
socio-spatial organization of urban space into communities of workers, centered on industrial
production facilities [60,61], and aiming to reach the goal of egalitarianism. However, keeping
industrial production in a city center imposes serious challenges to urban livability and sustainability.
The priority given to production over living infrastructure also caused its problems, such as a shortage
of housing.
Following a neoliberal turn in the advanced capitalist world in the late 1970s, urban China
also experienced profound ‘neoliberal shifts’ [62], where ‘neoliberal elements interdigitated with
authoritarian centralized control’ [58] (p. 120) to form a particular path. As a result, Chinese
urbanization was reshaped. Land commodification, as a salient restructuring force in post-reform
urbanization, released previous non-circulating assets into capital accumulation. This is a mechanism
of neoliberalism that began in 1988 with a milestone distinction between land ownership and land
use rights, followed by the legitimization of paid land use that allowed urban land use rights to be
leased at a profit for a period of time. As a consequence, land has become the main financial asset for
local governments. The introduction of a tax-sharing system in 1994 was another seminal event that
reshaped the power structure between central and local levels and further promoted urbanization,
with much responsibility given to urban governance. This situation has combined capital and state
power to transform China—a process that is often conceptualized using Western theories as a Chinese
socialist pro-growth machine [63,64].
In the post-reform era, the locality was actively integrated into capital accumulation and intercity
competition, while urban space was gradually remolded to follow a capital logic. Urban space has
been incorporated into various politics of accumulation, such as inner city displacement in the early
1990s, development zone fever in the late 1990s, city branding, and new town construction in the
mid-2000s [23,65]. Consequently, urban planning was utilized as a tool for urban growth. In other
words, urban planning has left its service to industrialism and began to serve entrepreneurial urbanism.
Nevertheless, the municipal master plan (essentially a comprehensive land-use-oriented plan) still
guides and controls investments by providing a spatial ‘blueprint’ [59]. Critics have noted that the
neoliberal perspective of the transformation of planning in China overlooks many elements (for
instance, the manner and degree of state intervention and values of the socialist ideology) inherited
from the socialist system [66–68]. Additionally, the spatial structure has continuity. Beijing is an
example of long-term politics and infrastructure policies that reinforce its monocentric spatial structure.
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However, even more fundamentally, egalitarianism, as a long-term goal, has not been abandoned
in China, at least in theory. The communist ideology and values (such as common wealth, social
equity, collectivism), as well as some socialist institutional arrangements, are still embedded in China’s
urban change [16]. As a result, the process of localization of neoliberalism has confronted institutional
resistance and constraints.
For instance, the system of tender, auction, and listing (TAL, zhao pai gua) was introduced in
1990 to enhance the marketization process of urban land. Until 2004, it was mandatory that all land
granted for commercial use was transacted through the TAL process. However, in Beijing, most land
transactions continue to be conducted via administrative allocation and negotiation. Another example
includes the welfare provision transformation policy on housing reform (SC (1998) No.23), which
officially abolished the work-unit-based housing provision system in 1998 and paved the way for the
marketization of housing. However, a new form has emerged called ‘new danwei’, which takes the
merits of socialist danwei [69].
Below, we consider the dynamics of a brownfield as a mirror of the broader macroeconomic changes
and transforming ideology. We seek to understand the changing spatial fabric of brownfield sites as
a result of economic restructuring, changing urban governance, and social–economic development
philosophies that are essentially affected by ideological transformation. Table 1 provides an overview
of our analytical framework as a multi-level process, basing on the experiences of Beijing and its
brownfield areas. We will now turn to discussing these experiences in more detail.
4. Transition from an Industrial City to a Post-Industrial Metropolis
After the Communist party came to power in 1949 and established the socialist command economy,
Beijing was transformed from an emerging ‘consumer city’ into a socialist ‘productive city’ [70,71].
Modernizing China’s industrial system was a national strategy, and, at that time, urban planning acted
as a “territorial organization of productive force” to facilitate economic priorities.
To emphasize the priority of heavy industry, plans for industrial areas in Beijing emerged in the
1954 version of the master plan, The Key Points of the Draft Plan for the Renovation and Expansion of Beijing,
and the document The Key Points of Beijing Urban Development. Considering the densely populated
urban core (area within today’s Second Ring Road) and the physical density of the administrative
institutions, large manufacturing industry areas were planned and mainly constructed in the area just
outside the core built-up area at the time—between today’s Third and Fifth Ring Road.
Since then, while industrialization was successfully achieved, over time, it not only caused urban
population growth, but also the emergence of various tensions with regard to the social functioning
of Beijing. As Beijing continued to expand outward and beyond those original industrial areas, the
latter also found themselves being “moved” from being at a far periphery to becoming more and
more part of the inner city. This produced issues with environmental pollution and the necessity to
“leapfrog” with new urban developments and infrastructure further and further from the historic core.
At the same time, the powerful industrial departments were not interested in vacating those areas and
engaging in a costly removal of factories. Apart from the fixed costs of the productive facilities, that
would also mean a removal of the whole settlement system of their workers.
The macroeconomic conditions in the 1980s encouraged the development of services and light
industries and brought about attempts to adapt the socialist productive city. To address the shortage
of urban services and poor infrastructure in the early 1980s, Beijing reoriented itself away from a
“productive city” and towards displaying an image of a renowned historical and cultural city. A new
“dispersed constellations” pattern was proposed to guide population growth, with some related Soviet
ideas of urban planning, such as “satellite towns”, and heritage preservation introduced in the 1982
master plan.
Further market-oriented reforms in the 1990s contributed to Beijing’s rapid transformation into an
“international city”. This process sped up removing polluting and energy-intensive activities, especially
since the municipal state set the hi-tech industry as one of its core goals in 1997. A new industrial
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geography formed in the process of industrial redistribution across the city, with development zones
and high-tech parks emerging as its spatial carriers. Following the accession of China to the WTO
(Word Trade Organization) in 2001, Beijing became a hotspot of foreign investment.
Preparations for the 2008 Olympic Games catalyzed a new round of urban development in terms
of infrastructure development (new subway lines, light rails, high-speed train to the airport, fifth and
sixth ring roads) and a new round of reterritorialization [23,71,72]. For example, rural counties in
the outer suburbia were administratively changed into Beijing’s urban districts in the early 2000s to
pave the way for the land needed for Beijing’s expansion [72]. A new industrial geography eventually
formed across the metropolitan area. For example, if Chaoyang District (an eastern suburb, which also
contains the Fatou area discussed below) was the main manufacturing cluster in 1985, by the end of
2004, because of promotion of polycentric development in outer suburban areas, Daxing and Shunyi
New Town had become the main area of upgraded manufacturing [73]. The municipal state published
acts to enforce the out-migration of manufacturing in the name of the environment and national image
(the Beijing Olympic Games were seen as a window onto the world). In 2000, following environmental
considerations and the ‘Green Olympic Games’ slogan, the city planned to reduce the ratio of industrial
land use to 7% within five years to solve the problem of its severe air and noise pollution. The core idea
behind these initiatives, as well as the accompanying redevelopment processes, was to increase land
values for local revenue and to further make room for global investment among intensified intra-city
competition and place-branding [73].
After the 2010s, this de-manufacturing process went beyond Beijing’s provincial boundaries.
Beijing now claimed itself as a global city, while the “coordinated development of the
Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei region” was raised to the status of a national strategy. This strategy accelerated
the dispersal of the functions that were not considered essential for the capital city. Following a long
decline of the city manufacturing industry and the growing service sector and knowledge economy,
the sector structure in Beijing has dramatically changed since 1980 (Table 2).
Table 2. Economic structure in Beijing (%).
Year
GDP Employment
Primary
Industry
Secondary
Industry
Tertiary
Industry
Primary
Industry
Secondary
Industry
Tertiary
Industry
1980 4.4 68.7 26. 9 24.4 42.8 32.8
1990 8.7 52.3 39.0 14.5 44.9 40.6
2000 2.5 32.4 65.1 11.8 33.6 54.6
2010 0.9 23.5 75.7 6.0 19.7 74.4
2018 0.4 18.6 81.0 3.7 14.7 81.6
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook.
5. Urbanization through Industrialization
The Fatou area is located in the Chaoyang District in the southeast of Beijing’s central city. This area
used to be a chemical manufacturing complex (industrial production area with residential community)
located in exurbia Beijing. It was consequently incorporated into the inner city of Beijing as one of ten
major residential constellations, located within a 10–20 km radius circle around the city center. Fatou is
located approximately 12 km southeast of Tiananmen Square (the city center) between the Fourth Ring
Road and the Fifth Ring Road, 9 km south of the CBD (Central Business District) area, 10 km southwest
of Tongzhou New Town (a municipal administrative sub-center), and 6 km north of Yizhuang New
Town (Beijing’s economic–technological development area) (see Figure 1). After recent redevelopment,
Fatou now represents a mixed-use functional complex (which combines residential, industrial, heritage
preservation, and cultural tourism). The area also acts as a key node of the municipal master plan, as
well as a strategic nexus of the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei Region.
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1958, the docu ent Principles for Urban Development (Draft) na ed the socialist capital of Beijing a
odernized industrial base that mainly focused on iron and steel, engineering, electric manufacturing,
and the organic synthetic chemistry industry. After the functions of the city were confirmed, the
productive forces were territorialized according to the development priorities and the functioning
zoning planning (Figure 2). At the same time, planners tried to integrate Soviet planning approaches,
such as satellite towns, into Beijing’s practice. A number of satellite towns centered on large-scale
SOEs (state-owned enterprises) were built up in suburban areas, linked via ring roads and radial roads
and separated by green belts [66]. Borrowed from the Soviet concept of a micro-district (mikrorayon in
Russian), the unique Chinese danwei system was formed based on a limited journey to work [61,66].
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Fatou, a previously rural area, emerged as one of the new industrial sites. According to planning
from 1958, Fatou was established as a chemical industrial zone in the south-eastern suburb (Fatou area)
occupying farmland in the Nanmofang Township and the Wangsiying Township. In March 1959, on the
original site of a nitrogen fertilizer plant and an electrolyte plant, the Beijing coking chemical plant was
established as a tribute project for the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic
of China (Figure 3). This plant provided coal gas as the energy resource for Beijing’s residential and
office buildings. Subsequently, a dyestuff plant and many other small-sized chemical-industrial-related
plants moved into the area to form an industrial agglomeration.
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One of the aims of urban planning was to build functional ‘communities’ that would provide
efficient living and working environments based on the norms for the provision of productive and living
conditions. The living quarters (sheng huo qu) with small-scale commercial facilities, infrastructure,
and residential communities were consequently built up to allow employees to live in relatively close
proximity to their workplace. This kind of industrial area is like a relatively independent small society
in the so-called “enterprise-run society (qi ye ban she hui)” system. These areas were especially created
for state-owned industrial enterprises that could exercise high-level power and had the ability to
mobilize resources and provide social welfare and housing for their employees. In 1960, the Fatou
residential office (sub-district office, jie dao) was established, and the district was incorporated into the
urban management system. Fatou became an urbanized area through the industrialization process.
By the 1970s, Fatou had formed an area centered on a “Z”-shaped main road named Chemical
Industry Road (hua gong lu), which had both production and living functions (Figure 4). During
its peak, many chemical industrial enterprises and institutions agglomerated there, including the
Beijing No. 1 chemical plant, Beijing No. 2 chemical plant, Beijing organic chemical plant, No. 1 glass
factory, No. 2 l ss factory, Beijing coking plant, Beijing Institute of Chemical Reagents, and others.
Residential areas such as Fatou Beili, Jinchanli, and Jinchan Beili were established along the Chemical
Industry Road.
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6. From In-Migration to Out-Migration
The gradual arrival of neoliberalism since the 1980s has changed the functions and morphologies
of cities like in the other formerly socialist l c s ri ci tr sf r ti s [77]. First, the role
of cities as production bases was reconsidered. In 1983, the master plan of Beijing reconceptualized
the city as a “national political and cultural center” i st f “eco o ic center”, and initiated the
decentralization of manufacturing activities a fr t tr l it . This involved the creation
of “decentralized conglomerates”, which acco odated i stri l t r ris s t t were moved to
suburban areas. Particularly polluting or energy-intensive activities were removed from more central
areas to give space for a “high-end” sector. Fatou, the industrial area located in the southeast outskirts
of the city, initially became a recipient destination for some of those activities.
However, foll wing Beijing’s master plan of 1992, the city was repositioned as not only the political
and cultural center of China, but also as “a first-class, modern global city.” Global cities serve as sites
for production and markets of innovation [78]. To i crease global competition, high-tech and IT-related
industries were deemed to be the new engines of urba gr wth. This gave rise to th booming
construction of industrial parks. Zhongguancun (known as China’s Silico Valley) was officially
recognized by the central gover ment in 1988 as the first nation-level “Beiji g High-Technology
Industry Development Experimental Zone.” The Yizhuang Development Area was established in 1992
and promoted to a state-level ec nomic nd t chnological developm nt z ne in 1994. A batch of ther
development zones at diff rent lev ls were gr dually formed. By 1999, for the first time, the proportion
of the tertiary industry had exceeded that of the secondary industry.
A salient turning point for Fatou was in the late 1990s when a series of industrial replacement
and relocation policies were introduced, such as the policies to “retire the secondary industries within
the Third Ring Road while advancing the tertiary industries” (tui er jin san) and “vacate the land
within the Fourth Ring Road and upgrade secondary industries after moving out” (tui si jin er). After
1997, when the municipal government set the high-tech industry as the core driver for urban growth,
these relocation and regeneration processes sped up. By then, Fatou had become a place of industries’
out-migration, and as urban expansion of Beijing progressed, Fatou was administratively incorporated
into the central urban area and planned as one of the then ten peripheral residential constellations.
With the first green belt established between the constellations and urban core, industry enterprises
out-migrated, new residential buildings were constructed, and the landscape and environment were
greatly improved. In the process of further globalization, Beijing’s flagship project of the Olympic
Games was an incentive as well as a state endeavor to speed up Beijing’s process of deindustrialization.
Unlike the competition among candidate cities in the US, central government played a decisive role
in choosing Beijing to be the host city for the Olympic Games [71]. Consistent with the central state’s
will to improve its international recognition, the Beijing Olympic Games were financially supported by
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the central government with an estimated 280 billion yuan. Further deindustrialization and industrial
relocation processes were bolstered and were the rationale for the environmental consideration and the
slogan of ‘Green Beijing Olympic Games.’ In 2000, a plan to reduce the ratio of industrial land use to
7% within five years to solve the severe problems of air and noise pollution was instituted. The Beijing
Olympic Action Plan (Beijing Aoyun Xingdong Guihua) in 2002 stated that approximately 200 industrial
enterprises located in the south-eastern industrial areas and those located within the Fourth Ring
Road were required to finish their relocation before 2008. In this context, the Beijing coking chemical
plant (a representative enterprise in Fatou) was closed in 2003 and, three years later, relocated to the
Hebei Province.
7. The Formation and Recycling of Urban Brownfields
The redevelopment agendas related to bringing brownfields back into use have dominated
the discourse of sustainable development in post-industrial cities. Since Beijing’s Songjiazhuang
subway construction worker poisoning incident in 2004, brownfield issues came prominently into
the public attention in China. The Beijing municipal government initiated a regulatory framework
for environmental assessment and management planning for deserted sites, addressing the risk of
historical contamination exposure. Two documents from this framework are of particular importance:
Site Environment Assessment Guidelines (January 2007) and Notice on Implementing Soil Environment
Assessment for Sites Left from Industry Relocation (July 2007). Environmental assessments have been
conducted on more than 50 contaminated sites, among which the Beijing coking chemical plant in
Fatou became a target for brownfield remediation after long-term chemical industry production.
After land remediation and environmental assessments, the industrial land renewal process
commonly includes several stages, such as adjustment to the land plan, modification of the land contract,
land renewal and construction, and land transaction. Brownfield redevelopment in Chinese urban
areas is usually embedded in a centralized decision-making process, among which local government,
state-owned enterprises, and developers are key stakeholders [5]. With regard to recycling, residential
redevelopment has emerged as an important option for brownfield reuse, especially for sites with a
locational advantage. Institutionally, this recycling and regeneration process of brownfield sites in
the Chinese context involves a redeployment of the urban space under SOEs’ control to the market.
The case of Fatou was a state-led redevelopment process in which the Municipal Land Arrangement
and Reserve Center acted as the intermediate agency. In addition, the brownfield regeneration that
happened in Fatou was linked with shantytown regeneration in other parts of the city, under which
relocated residents from central areas were rehoused in new housing complexes built on regenerated
areas in Fatou. This indicates how the Chinese hybrid system provides supportive policies to guarantee
a transition from a socialist housing provision to a market operation.
According to a revised land management law of 1998, all administratively allocated land parcels
must first be transferred to the municipal government before being released to developers. This has
legalized the transfer of exclusive control over state land to local governments [23]. The Municipal
Land Arrangement and Reserve Center (MLARC) was established in 2001 as a manager of state-owned
land with official authority in the process of the transfer of land use rights.
With the shutdown of the Beijing dyestuff plant in Fatou in 2003, the SOEs started to deal with
state-owned assets in the original plant that were allocated through socialist land allocation in the
pre-reform era. In 2004, an acquisition agreement (land-transfer contract) between the dyestuff plant
and the MLARC was reached to retrieve land use rights from the former user (SOEs). After primary
development (including demolition, infrastructure construction), the land parcel was reserved in the
municipal land inventory. Being aware of the development cost, the MLARC organized an open-land
auction and public tender, while second developers (construction developers) were asked to bid for the
land parcel and to pay official rates for the transfer of land use rights. At the same time, the MLARC,
as the intermediate owner of the industrial site, continued to provide public obligations.
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After the plan was adjusted, the land use of this parcel was determined by the planning commission
in 2009 for a capped-price housing (xian jia fang) program, which provides subsidized housing to
applicants with some conditions. The capped-price housing program is part of the public housing
provision system in the post-reform era and embodies an attempt of the socialist state to balance
efficiency and social equity. A series of housing reforms launched in the 1980s radically changed
the socialist housing provision system of the pre-reform era, in which housing was controlled by
work units or municipal housing authorities as social welfare with socialist ideologies. The previous
employees of the dyestuff plant used to live in housing around their workplace obtained through
a work-unit system. Some of the workers sacrificed their whole lives for this plant and established
strong emotional bonds, as well as a sense of belonging, to the plant and the place. In the transition
from a member of a workplace (dan wei ren) to a citizen in a society (she hui ren), employees are now
provided with an in-kind or monetary compensation from their previous employer (SOEs). When the
compensation agreement is reached, employees can receive extra subsidies when purchasing housing
in Shuanghe Jiayuan (the residential unit built on the original dyestuff plant, their workplace, see
Figure 5). According to the capped-price housing policy that targeted low-to-middle-income urban
households (hukou), eligible applicants can apply for a house for 7400 yuan/m2 (in 2009), while original
employees can receive a reduced price of 5800 yuan/m2 and can also receive an extra 2800 yuan/m2
subsidy from the dyestuff plant.
Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 19 
Land Arrangement and Reserve Center (MLARC) was established in 2001 as a manager of state-
owned land with official authority in the process of the transfer of land use rights. 
With the shutdown of the Beijing dyestuff plant in Fatou in 2003, the SOEs started to deal with 
state-owned assets in the original plant that were allocated through socialist land allocation in the 
pre-reform era. In 2004, an acquisition agreement (land-transfer contract) between the dyestuff plant 
and the MLARC was reached to retrieve land use rights from the former user (SOEs). After primary 
development (including demolition, infrastructure construction), the land parcel was reserved in the 
municipal land inventory. Being aware of the development cost, the MLARC organized an open-land 
a ction and public tender, while second developers (construction developers) were asked to bid or 
the land parcel and to pay official rates for the transfer of land use rights. At the same time, the 
MLARC, as the intermediate owner of the industrial site, continued to provide public obligations. 
After the plan was adjusted, the land use of this parcel was determined by the planning 
commission in 2009 for a capped-price housing (xian jia fang) program, which provides subsidized 
housing to applicants with some conditions. The capped-price housing program is part of the public 
housing provision system in the post-reform era and embodies an attempt of the socialist state to 
balance efficiency and social equity. A series of housing reforms launched in the 1980s radically 
changed the socialist housing provision system of the pre-reform era, in which housing was 
controlled by work units or municipal housing authorities as social welfare with socialist ideologies. 
The previous employees of the dyestuff plant used to live in housing around their workplace 
obtained through a work-unit system. Some of the workers sacrificed their whole lives for this plant 
and established strong emotional bonds, as well as a sense of belonging, to the plant and the place. 
In the transition from a member of a workplace (dan wei ren) to a citizen in a society (she hui ren), 
employees are now provided with an in-kind or monetary compensation from their previous 
employer (SOEs). When the compensation agreement is reached, employees can receive extra 
subsidies when purchasing housing in Shuanghe Jiayuan (the residential unit built on the original 
dyestuff plant, their workplace, see Figure 5). According to the capped-price housing policy that 
targeted low-to-middle-income urban households (hukou), eligible applicants can apply for a house 
for 7400 yuan/m2 (in 2009), while original employees can receive a reduced price of 5800 yuan/m2 and 
can also receive an extra 2800 yuan/m2 subsidy from the dyestuff plant. 
 
Figure 5. Shuanghe Jiayuan Community. Photo by Nyuying Wang. 
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Figure 6a) with the production equipment was moved to the Hebei Province. Then, part of the site 
was allocated in 2014 for residential relocation from the Shantytown vacation program surrounding 
the Temple of Heaven. This cross-community program was instituted to conserve heritage and as 
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e eiji g coki g la t cease its ro ctio i 2006, a t e ai factory area (re area i
Fig re 6a) with the production equipment was moved to the Hebei Province. Then, part of the site was
allocated in 2014 for residential relocation from the S antytown vacation program surro nding the
Temple of Heaven. This cross-community program was instituted to conserve heritage and as part of
the national state’s obligation under the World Heritage Conventions to maintain and rehabilitate the
outer wall of the temple (tan qiang) by 2030. The Temple of Heaven (situated in the south-eastern part
of central Beijing, next to the south end of the Beijing central axis) was included in the World Cultural
Heritage Sites list in 1998. According to the “integrity” principle (the wholeness and intactness of the
natural and/or cultural heritage and its attributes), shanty buildings in this area (established since the
1960s due to housing shortages) must be removed. Therefore, the municipal government started to
negotiate with the residents living there and gave them subsidies to relocate. Part of the compensation
policy included purchasing housing in the Yanbao Qidong residential unit (see Figure 6c) in Fatou at a
discounted price.
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However, the southern part of the coking plant (yellow in Figure 6a), in which the office and
service sectors used to be located, did not move with the factory and keeps its industrial function in an
upgraded way. On the original site, the Jiao’ao office building was built (see Figure 6d, Figure 7) in
2015 as a technology research and development sector. This building was also incorporated into the
Zhongguancun industrial park, locating incubators for creative and technology industries.
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i fi
fi As the awareness of heritage protection grows in China, so has the interest in it.
For example, the Wuxi forum on the conservation of China’s cultural heritage, organized by the State
Administration of Cultural Heritage in 2006, focused on industrial heritage, vernacular buildings,
twentieth-century heritage, and cultural landscapes. The government is realizing a vital role that
cultural resources play in place-remaking. At the same time, old employees have a strong sense of
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attachment to the local infrastructure and appealed for its protection from demolishment. It was
reported that during two sessions in 2007, more than 50 municipal NPC deputies (Deputy to National
People’s Congress) and members of the CPPCC (China People’s Political Consultative Conference)
were involved in six proposals for industrial heritage resource protection and the reutilization of the
Beijing coking chemical plant site. The industrial buildings and structures witnessed the progress
and achievement in industrial technology (the success of the first self-designed coking chemical oven
in China) over the past 50 years. The plant also held a part of the urban historical memory (as the
major energy supply base for the capital city). As a result, the eastern part of the original coking plant
parcel was put under protection, and plans were made for it to be an industrial heritage park in the
future (See Figure 8). In 2018, this area was included in the first group of industrial heritage sites at the
national level for its contribution and status in the socialist capital industrial development phase.
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the one hand, a seri s of national-level institutional tr nsformations (including land use rights,
tax sharing, and welfare provision) have allow d organizatio al cha ges o the city l vel to follow
market rules (such as pro-development local state, privatization of d nwei, and marketization of welfare
provision). In the case of Beijing, the socialist spatial legacy (includin its geography of manufacturing
enterprises scatt red in c ntral urban areas) h s lost its inherited purpose and was reo ganized into a
new spatial system of capitalist-oriented development—basically allowi g the m rket economy to
fe st on the socialist ‘l gacy’ and twist the latter to its requirements. Here, brownfield formation as
a historically spec fic produc of the political ch ice of a particular e onomic nd geo-institutional
regime [53] represe ts th spatial legaci s of socialist urbanism. The redevelopment process marketizes
these spatial legacies. The land acquired in he pre-reform ra through administrative allocation
to SOEs without any charge is, in turn, commodified and transformed from centrally controlled
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production to an economic asset in the post-reform era [63]. Urban development helps the expansion
of marketized urban space through “local growth coalition” with SOEs, and land that was formerly
locked up by the old regime has been released to the redevelopment market.
On the other hand, active elements of the communist ideology (such as statism and collectivism)
continue to apply their highly centralized logic, top-down governance structure, and ideological
propositions to shape the city landscape. For instance, the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games involved more
than an urban-level entrepreneurial branding, growth seeking, and marketing strategy. There was
also a heavy-handed intervention by the Chinese state to construct the city according to its ideological
imaginaries. Following the socialist “concentrate energy on major tasks” (ji zhong li liang ban da shi)
regime, the national-level resources were reterritorialized and concentrated at the urban-level locality
to ensure that Beijing continues to play its role of a model modern-day capital city of the communist
China. Furthermore, various forms of state control and intervention measures ensure the continuation
of socialist welfare commitments. This active communist ideology is seen in Fatou’s case with specific
policy regimes, such as subsidy policy for former state-owned employees as a kind of extension of
the danwei welfare system. This holds up the transformation from the danwei system into a “totally”
marketized welfare provision, a product of the gradualist transition and hybrid institutions, which in
turn, guarantees the continuity and stability of social transformations.
Although Fatou’s case has its own contextual development trajectory, it shares many commonalities
with other brownfield projects in China, especially in terms of formation and redevelopment
mechanisms. The municipal state has actively promoted entrepreneurism in urban initiatives through a
series of practices, such as a land-banking system and a pro-growth coalition with SOEs and developers.
However, Fatou, as a former industrial complex in the capital city, has always had a higher chance
to benefit from its position where national-level resources are concentrated. Post-industrialization
trends occur first and foremost in China’s most developed metropolitan areas, thus causing an uneven
geography of urban development nationwide.
Urban brownfield sites thus reflect the complex transformation of urban China; their formation
and redevelopment mirror changes in the community-level spatial fabric, urban-level social practices,
and national-level institutional arrangements. The re-combination of active socialist political ideology
into the operational neoliberal ideology (or the localization of global neoliberalist logic into Chinese
institutional settings, economic–political conditions, and cultural ideology) causes the hybridization of
spatial processes. We have also provided an analytical framework that combines the multi-level and
temporal evolution as a window into the broader understanding of the relationships between evolving
ideologies and hybrid spatiality of urban transformations.
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